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This study examines the effects of CEO equity-based compensation and anti-takeover
provisions on corporate innovation. Using a large sample of US firms over the period
1996–2014, we find that long-term incentives have a stronger influence on innovation when
combined with takeover threats. We also show that equity-based compensation is more
likely to spur innovation for small firms and firms in industries with high product mar-
ket competition and innovation pressure. However, this effect is somewhat weaker in the
presence of anti-takeover provisions, suggesting that takeover protection encouragesman-
agerial shirking even when external competition is high. Finally, in addition to the existing
evidence on the valuation effect of CEO equity-based compensation, we identify innova-
tion as an important channel through which managerial incentives can enhance firm value.
Our results have potential implications for shareholders, managers and policymakers.
Innovation demands risk-taking – which, in turn, en-
tails redefining failure, stripping away its power of in-
hibit (Lynne Doughtie)
Introduction
Corporate innovation is the process of developing
new technology, practice and strategy that in-
crease firm value. It is the key to a firm’s long-term
competitiveness and sustainability (Romer, 1987,
1990), especially in highly competitive industries
(Adams, 1990). However, investment in innovation
is risky and time-consuming, as it involves explor-
ing new and untested approaches that are likely
to fail (Manso, 2011). For this reason, risk-averse
managers often opt for routine operations rather
than innovation (March, 1991). Identifying new
ways to motivate these managers to invest more
in innovation is of critical importance not only to
firm survival, but also to the competition between
nations (Solow, 1957). In this study, we aim to
investigate whether takeover protection affects the
ability of long-term managerial incentives to spur
innovation and whether managerial incentives
affect firm value through innovation.
Several studies argue that managerial compen-
sation schemes, such as executive stock options,
will promote innovation because the value of
equity-based compensation depends largely on
the long-term performance of the firm (Kim,
Patro and Pereira, 2017; Lerner and Wulf, 2007).
However, such incentives alone may not be suf-
ficient to guarantee engagement in innovation,
as equity-based compensation can increase the
sensitivity of a manager’s portfolio to their firm’s
stock price movements (Low, 2009; Ross, 2004).
Risk-averse managers also would not invest in
innovation when a takeover threat is imminent,
as the expected payoff from such investment is
long-term and highly uncertain (Shleifer and
Summers, 1988) and the market is often myopic
(Ali, Ciftci and Cready, 2012; Martin, 2012).
Thus, while equity-based incentives can protect
managers from market myopia (Thanassoulis,
2013), they cannot provide safeguards against
opportunistic takeovers, which target underpriced
firms (Humphery-Jenner, 2014). Furthermore,
Stein (1988) argues that, due to the unforeseeable
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nature of innovation, the market may undervalue
R&D-intensive firms. Thus, without appropriate
protection, equity-based compensation may not
provide managers with sufficient incentives to
engage in innovation. Manso (2011) formalizes
this view and develops a theoretical model in
which motivating managers to engage in innova-
tion requires compensation schemes that reward
long-term success and offer protection from
early failure. However, the principal–agent model
views takeover threats as a market-monitoring
device that deters managerial shirking (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Thus, any attempt to protect
managers from market discipline may undermine
their incentive to act in the interests of sharehold-
ers (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). In the context of
innovation, a reduction in takeover threats would
allow managers to receive high compensation
without investing in risky projects. Thus, in the
presence of anti-takeover provisions, equity-based
compensation may have a weak or even a negative
effect on innovation.
In addition to the literature on the link between
incentives and innovation, several studies show
that equity-based compensation can increase firm
value (Conyon and Freeman, 2004; Sun, Cahan
and Emanuel, 2009). However, the channels
through which incentives affect firm value are
not yet well understood. In this study, we are
interested in whether equity-based compensation
can create value through its effect on innovation.
Prior research on the impact of innovation on
firm value is also muddled. Some studies argue
that innovation yields better performance (Bayus,
Erickson and Jacobson, 2003; Pauwels et al.,
2004), while others suggest that innovation does
not add value (Foster and Kaplan, 2011). In
an attempt to clarify the apparent contradic-
tions between these studies, Sorescu and Spanjol
(2008) classify innovations into breakthrough
and incremental and argue that the former is
more likely to generate economic rents and
enhance firm value. Risk-averse managers may
avoid innovations that increase risk, even when
such innovations generate economic rents. This
is because the increased risk may endanger the
firm’s survival and have negative consequences
on managers. Thus, equity-based compensation
can enhance firm value by motivating managers
to act in the shareholders’ interests and prioritize
investments in innovation with potential economic
rents.
In summary, this study attempts to enhance our
understanding of the role of managerial incentives
and takeover protection in the value-creation
process and contributes to the literature by an-
swering the following questions: Does the effect
of managerial incentives on innovation depend
upon the extent to which managers are protected
from the takeover pressure? And do managerial
compensation schemes affect firm value through
innovation? We investigate these questions empir-
ically using a large sample of US firms. We find
that carefully designed incentives can simulate
innovation better when used in conjunction with
market discipline. We also find overwhelming
evidence that takeover protection has a positive
direct effect and a negative moderating effect on
innovation, with the effects being generally more
pronounced for small firms and firms in highly
competitive industries. Finally, we show that in-
novation outcome partially mediates the positive
effect of equity-based compensation on firm value.
This evidence suggests that managers who are
compensated by share-based plans can increase
their wealth by investing in innovative projects
with the potential to generate economic rents.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold.
First, unlike the extant literature that tends to
treat incentives and takeover protection as inde-
pendent determinants of innovation (Atanassov,
2013; Lerner and Wulf, 2007), we argue, and
provide evidence, that these two determinants are
interrelated and the ultimate effect of incentives
on innovation depends on the presence of anti-
takeover provisions. Second, prior studies present
two conflicting views on the relationship between
takeover protection and innovation. On the one
hand, takeover protection can mitigate managerial
myopia and encourage managers to invest in long-
term projects, such as innovation (Manso, 2011).
On the other hand, insulating a firm from takeover
threats can lead to managerial entrenchment and
underinvestment in risky activities, includingR&D
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy,
1990). We contribute to this debate by showing
that these two effects coexist and the overall im-
pact of takeover protection on innovation reflects
the relative strength of each effect, which, in turn,
depends on the nature of the managerial com-
pensation schemes adopted by the firm. Finally,
while several studies document a positive relation
between incentives and innovation, the channels
through which incentivized managers improve
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firm value are not well understood. In this study,
we argue, and provide supporting evidence, that
compensation packages which align the managers’
and shareholders’ objectives create value by mo-
tiving managers to engage in innovative projects
with the potential to generate economic rents.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. The next section outlines our theoretical
framework and develops our hypotheses. Then,
data and empirical methodology are presented.We
discuss our results, then report additional results
and robustness checks before concluding.
Theory and hypotheses
Theoretical background
Innovation is an experimental and risky process,
which often involves significant resources, long in-
vestment periods and highly uncertain outcomes
(Holmstrom, 1989). Because of the risks involved
in exploration activities, risk-averse managers tend
to dislike investment in innovation and opt for
other projects with lower costs, shorter time spans
and more predictable outcomes. This underinvest-
ment in innovation may, in turn, have a detrimen-
tal effect on the firm’s competitive position and its
market value.
From an agency perspective, Baker, Jensen
and Murphy (1988) argue that internal incentives
determine how managers behave. Managers may
be reluctant to invest in innovation unless they are
adequately compensated for doing so (Eisenhardt,
1989; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007). In a theoret-
ical model, Manso (2011) shows that the standard
principal–agent contract motivates managers to
repeat routine activities rather than engage in in-
novation. To address this problem, Manso (2011)
argues for the use of incentive schemes that re-
ward long-term success. An experimental study by
Ederer andManso (2013) also confirms the impor-
tance of such schemes in stimulating innovation.
Manso’s (2011) theoretical framework sug-
gests that another essential element to motivate
innovation is tolerance of failure. He argues
that because of the risky and opaque nature
of R&D investments, investors may undervalue
R&D. This, in turn, may increase the exposure of
R&D-intensive firms to takeover threats. Shleifer
and Summers (1988) also argue that acquirers
can make risk-free profit from targets that invest
heavily in innovation. In a similar vein, Ali, Ciftci
and Cready (2012) show that shareholders under-
estimate the future benefits of R&D investments,
making R&D-intensive firms easy takeover tar-
gets. Takeover threats, in turn, may lead managers
to focus more on short-term profits rather than
long-term objectives. Gillan, Hartzell and Parrino
(2009) also find that comprehensive and explicit
employment agreements are more popular when
the work relationship is at risk of termination.
Humphery-Jenner (2014) andManso (2011) argue
that one way to overcome managerial myopia and
induce investment in innovation is by ensuring
that incumbent managers are entrenched enough
to retain their jobs in the face of hostile takeovers.
To put it differently, it is reasonable to argue that
some degree of job protection is required to align
managers’ innovation decisions with shareholders’
objectives.
However, moral hazard models suggest that
takeover protection can be detrimental to inno-
vation. Specifically, without monitoring, managers
can prioritize their own interests over the interests
of shareholders (Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2009).
The lack of discipline allows risk-averse managers
to focus on routine activities with quicker and
safer returns rather than activities which maxi-
mize shareholder value (Jensen, 1988; Jensen and
Ruback, 1983). In other words, entrenched man-
agers are less likely to engage in risky activities,
such as innovation, when they are protected from
takeover pressure.
As the effect of takeover protection on innova-
tion is inconclusive, we attempt to investigate the
potential moderating role of takeover protection in
the relationship between incentives and innovation
(see Figure 1). We expect incentives to promote
innovation and protection to either strengthen
or weaken this effect, depending on whether
tolerance for failure motivates managers to pursue
innovation or leads them to prioritize their own
interests over the interests of shareholders. More
specifically, compensation schemes that reward
long-term success may not be sufficient to moti-
vate risk-averse managers to engage in innovation,
as innovative projects are inherently risky and
tend to be undervalued by the market (Thanas-
soulis, 2013). Thus, investing in such projects may
increase the firm’s riskiness and its exposure to
takeover threats. This implies that if anti-takeover
provisions can protect managers from the negative
consequences of hostile takeover, such provisions
would have a positive moderating effect on the
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 1. Moderation and mediation model
relationship between equity-based incentives and
innovation. However, if the reduction in takeover
threats promotes managerial shirking by allowing
managers to receive high compensation without
investing in risky innovative projects (Jensen and
Meckling, 1990), we would expect the takeover
protections to negatively moderate the impact of
incentives on innovation.
In addition to the direct effect of equity-based
compensation on firm value (Jensen andMeckling,
1976; Palmon et al., 2008), incentives may also
affect firm value indirectly through innovation.
Existing evidence on the impact of innovation
on firm value is largely mixed. Some studies find
that innovation enhances performance (Bayus,
Erickson and Jacobson, 2003; Pauwels et al.,
2004), whereas others suggest that innovating is
detrimental to firm value (Foster and Kaplan,
2011). In an attempt to reconcile the diverging
evidence, Sorescu and Spanjol (2008) argue that
innovation can only create value if it helps the
firm to generate economic rents. Since innovative
projects with the potential to generate economic
rents tend to be highly risky (Sorescu and Span-
jol, 2008), compensation packages that align
managers’ interests with those of shareholders
would be required in order to motivate managers
to invest in such projects. Therefore, we expect
innovation to (partially) mediate the relationship
between managerial incentives and firm value.
Hypothesis development
Incentives and innovation. The link between exec-
utive compensation and firms’ investment strate-
gies, such as R&D, has been widely investigated
in the literature (Chang et al., 2015; Sanyal and
Bulan, 2010). Several studies report a significantly
positive association between equity-based com-
pensation and R&D expenditure. Kim, Patro and
Pereira (2017) show that executive stock options
increase the sensitivity of CEOs’ wealth to their
firms’ stock volatility and promote investment in
risky projects. Similarly, Kini and Williams (2012)
find that higher tournament incentivesmotivate se-
nior managers to take more risks in order to in-
crease their chance of promotion to the rank of
CEO. Lerner andWulf (2007) also show that long-
term managerial incentives result in greater R&D
output. Similar results are obtained by Sanyal and
Bulan (2010), who document a positive association
between long-termmanagerial incentives and both
patents and citations to patents.1
To sum up, existing studies generally suggest
that long-term incentive plans promote innova-
tion. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H1: Firms that use more long-term incentives
in their CEO compensation plans are more
likely to engage in innovation.
The moderating effect of protection. It is com-
monly argued that carefully designed incentive
schemes, such as equity-based compensation, can
alleviate possible conflicts between shareholders
and managers and motivate managers to engage in
risky activities (Francis, Hasan and Sharma, 2011;
Lerner and Wulf, 2007). However, while equity-
based compensation rewards long-term success, it
may not be sufficient to induce risk-averse man-
agers to invest in innovation (Ederer and Manso,
2013; Manso, 2011). This is because investing in
innovation is a long and costly process, which
can leave a firm financially vulnerable, severely
harm its reputation and put it at a strategic disad-
vantage relative to its competitors. Evidence also
shows that the risk of becoming a takeover tar-
get can inhibit a firm’s R&D activity (Narayanan,
1985; Pugh, 1992). Thus, firms that are interested
in stimulating innovation should not only reward
1Only a few studies show that long-term incentives are
detrimental to innovation (see e.g. Ryan and Wiggins,
2002).
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long-term success, but also discourage the my-
opic behaviour of managers by protecting them
from takeover pressure. In other words, we expect
long-termmanagerial incentives to have a stronger
impact on innovation in firms with more anti-
takeover provisions. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H2a: The effect of CEO incentives on innova-
tion is positively moderated by takeover
protection.
However, academic research has not reached a
consensus on the relationship between takeover
protection and innovation. DeAngelo and Rice
(1983) argue that takeover threats serve as a
disciplinary device that forces managers to en-
gage in value-maximizing activities (Jain, 2012;
Mahoney, Sundaramurthy and Mahoney, 1997).
Thus, anti-takeover provisions may encourage
managerial entrenchment and undermine the
ability of long-term managerial incentives to
promote innovation. In other words, protection
from takeover threats may allow managers to
receive high compensation without engaging in
risky innovative projects. More formally:
H2b: The effect of CEO incentives on innova-
tion is negatively moderated by takeover
protection.
Innovation and firm value. Many studies show
that innovation has a significantly positive effect
on firm value (Camiso´n and Villar-Lo´pez, 2014;
Toivanen, Stoneman and Bosworth, 2002). How-
ever, others argue that innovation has little or no
effect on firm value (Foster and Kaplan, 2011;
Geroski, Machin and Van Reenen, 1993). Sorescu
and Spanjol (2008) argue that these apparently
conflicting findings reflect the differences in types
of innovation that firms go after. They argue that
incremental innovations can easily be imitated
by competitors and do not generate competitive
advantage for firms, whereas breakthrough inno-
vations, which are often protected by patents, can
effectively augment a firm’s position in market
competition. They also argue that breakthrough
innovations tend to increase firm riskiness, but
generate economic rents. This type of innovation
may therefore appeal to shareholders, who would
be more than compensated for the additional risk,
but not to managers, as the increase in risk may
endanger the firm’s survival and have negative con-
sequences on managers and other stakeholders.
Thus, without adequate rewards for taking addi-
tional risks, managers are less likely to invest in
risky innovative projects even when such projects
have the potential to generate economic rents.
Since appropriately designed incentives are shown
to alleviate possible conflicts between shareholders
and managers (Francis, Hasan and Sharma, 2011;
Lerner and Wulf, 2007), such incentives can also
motivate CEOs to invest in value-creating projects,
including innovation. More specifically:
H3: The positive effect of CEO incentives on
firm value is (partially) mediated by the
firm’s innovation performance.
Data and descriptive statistics
Our initial sample includes all US firms listed
on AMEX, NYSE or NASDAQ over the period
1996–2014. We chose 1996 as the start of our sam-
ple because it was the earliest we could retrieve
compensation and financial data with sufficient
quality. We downloaded the financial data from
Compustat, corporate governance, board char-
acteristics and executive compensation data from
Execucomp, takeover protection data from ISS
(formerly Riskmetrics) and patent and citation
data from the NBER patent citation database,
which is based on the USPTO Patent and Citation
Data.2 After removing financial firms and firms
with missing values, we winsorized all the vari-
ables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate
the influence of extreme observations. The sample
used in the regression analysis contains 15,586
firm-year observations for 1,932 unique firms.
We use both input- and output-oriented mea-
sures of innovation. We use the value of R&D
investment scaled by total assets to capture the
R&D intensity (He and Tian, 2013; O’Connor
and Rafferty, 2012). However, R&D intensity as a
measure of R&D activity has a number of draw-
backs. First, it is not always clear whether the
recorded R&D expenses truly reflect investment
2The USPTO website states that: ‘Patent classification
systems are largely designed for administrative purposes,
limiting their value formost research purposes. To address
this deficiency, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) devel-
oped a higher-level classification for the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) Patent Citation Data File
by aggregating US Patent Classification (USPC) classes
into economically relevant technology categories.’
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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in innovation (Chambers, Jennings and Thomp-
son, 2003). Second, not all R&D investments re-
sult in innovation. Just as corporate assets may be
wasted through empire building, so too may mis-
conducted R&D investments generate little value
but cost shareholders dearly. Hence, it is important
to investigate the outcome of the R&D process.
Following others, we evaluate a firm’s R&D pro-
ductivity via the number of patents it has success-
fully applied for. Since years of R&D investment
are required before a patent application can be sub-
mitted, we match the number of patent applica-
tions to other control variables of the previous two
years.3 Besides the number of patents, the quality
of patents is also an important measure of innova-
tion. Patents with high value can receive more cita-
tions over time than minor innovations. Thus, we
use the number of non-self-citations received by all
patents that a company has developed in a year to
quantify the value of patents acquired by the com-
pany in that year. Since citation data suffer from
a truncation problem (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg,
2001), we adjust the number of citations accord-
ing to the estimated citation distribution based on
industry and year.4
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for
the variables used in the sample. Most firms in
our sample do not have R&D expenditure. The
average R&D-to-total assets ratio is 5.8%. We
evaluate a firm’s innovation productivity by the
number of patents and citations it obtained in
a given year. Both measures are highly skewed,
as most firm-years in our sample record zero
patents and citations. Our analysis indicates that,
on average, firms develop 1.4 patents and receive
15 citations every year.
Following others (Francis, Hasan and Sharma,
2011; Lerner andWulf, 2007), we define long-term
CEO incentives (incentive) as the percentage of
equity-based compensation (i.e. restricted stocks,
stock options and long-term incentive plans) in the
total compensation. Because of the stock options’
unique focus on long-term performance (Hall
and Murphy, 2002), we also use the percentage of
stock options in total compensation as an alter-
native measure in the robustness analysis. Table 1
3In the robustness tests we use time lags of one year and
three years to verify the results.
4Since the patent and citation data only covers the period
until 2010, regressions with patent/citation as dependent
variables are based on 4,947 firm-year observations.
presents the statistics of the total compensation
(in thousands of US dollars), the percentage of
equity-based compensation and the percentage of
stock options in total compensation. It shows that
57.9% of the total CEO compensation is paid in
the form of equity or equity-related compensa-
tion, with stock options having greater value than
restricted stock and other long-term incentive
plans. In untabulated results, we find that CEO
compensation in the US market has increased
substantially over the sample period, with two
temporary setbacks in 2001 and 2007, and that
the percentage of equity-based compensation in-
creased steadily from 38% in 1996 to 74% in 2014.
To measure the extent to which managers are
protected from market discipline (protection), we
construct an index that reflects their firm’s use of
anti-takeover provisions, such as classified boards,
dual-class shares, super-majority voting, unequal
voting rights, confidential voting, cumulative vot-
ing, poison pills, golden parachutes and fair price
provision. Similar to Atanassov (2013), Chemma-
nur and Tian (2017) and Jain (2012) for each firm
in a given year, we give a score of one to each
provision that increases the difficulty of replac-
ing the incumbent management (e.g. poison pill)
or strengthens managerial entrenchment (e.g. ab-
sence of cumulative voting), and zero otherwise.
We then sum up the scores to construct a measure
for a firm’s overall takeover protection in that year.
This measure takes values from zero (for the least
protected firms) to eight (for the most protected
firms). Table 1 shows that the majority of the sam-
ple firms score between three and five.5
Table 1 also reports the descriptive statistics of
the various variables used in our regressions. Our
set of control variables consists of the well-known
determinants of innovation, including return on
assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, CEO tenure, capital
expenditure ratio, tangibility, financial constraints
(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), institutional own-
ership (Choi, Park and Hong, 2012), leverage
(Zhang, Chen and Feng, 2014), total assets and
financial analysts’ coverage (He and Tian, 2013).
A detailed definition of these variables is provided
in the Appendix and their correlation matrix is
5In the early period of the sample, corporate governance
data is recorded once in every two years. We interpo-
late the CG index for the missing years. This explains
the larger sample size of the CG index than individual
provisions.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min p50 Max
Innovation measures
R&D expenditure ($m) 218,100 15.091 72.819 0 0 611.000
R&D ratio 186,391 0.058 0.164 0 0 1.121
Patents 129,794 1.406 7.372 0 0 62
Citations 129,794 14.481 79.437 0 0 665.858
Incentives measures
CEO’s total compensation ($000) 33,392 5,319.277 9,894.839 0.001 3,000.757 655,448.000
CEO’s equity compensation (of total compensation) 33,323 0.579 0.286 0 0.650 0.979
CEO’s stock options (of total compensation) 33,323 0.181 0.274 0 0 0.935
Protection measures
CG index 22,463 4.102 1.293 1 4 7
Classified board 17,141 0.529 0.499 0 1 1
Dual-class shares 17,141 0.082 0.275 0 0 1
Super-majority voting 17,141 0.429 0.495 0 0 1
Unequal voting rights 17,141 0.021 0.143 0 0 1
Poison pill 17,141 0.361 0.48 0 0 1
Golden parachute 17,141 0.695 0.46 0 1 1
Fair price 17,141 0.177 0.382 0 0 1
No confidential voting 17,141 0.879 0.326 0 1 1
No cumulative voting 17,141 0.918 0.274 0 1 1
Firm characteristics
ROA 17,9871 −0.050 0.350 −1.204 0.061 0.264
Tobin’s Q 15,0564 2.432 2.554 0.699 1.412 11.041
CEO tenure 32,374 6.849 6.120 0 5 22.000
Capital expenditure 175,157 0.053 0.062 0 0.030 0.232
PPE 181,191 0.258 0.266 0.001 0.152 0.837
KZ index 124,635 −8.489 20.728 −79.000 −0.772 10.598
Institutional shareholding (%) 28,567 24.972 19.131 0 20.600 67.000
Analysts coverage 218,100 1.934 3.508 0 0 12.417
Debt ratio 184,926 0.252 0.260 0 0.180 0.905
Firm size ($m) 186,391 1,891.135 4,106.544 1.118 194.254 16,467.000
This table presents summary statistics for variables collected from a sample of listed US firms from 1996 to 2014. A detailed definition
of all variables used in our analysis is provided in the Appendix.
reported in Table 2. The highest correlation (of
0.69) is between capital expenditure ratio and
tangibility; all other correlations are below 0.5.
The rightmost column of Table 2 reports the
variance inflation factor (VIF). The highest value
for the VIF is 3.19, which is much smaller than
the benchmark of 10 for severe multicollinearity.
Methodology
We use two-stage least squares (2SLS) and si-
multaneous equations to examine the impact of
incentives, protection and their interaction on
innovation. We argue that these methods are
better suited to our analysis than the standard
ordinary least squares (OLS), mainly because of
endogeneity concerns. Specifically, the associa-
tions between R&D, incentives and protection
may reflect causalities other than those described
in the hypothesis development section. For ex-
ample, the decision to invest in R&D is linked to
firm performance, which may in turn affect the
CEO’s compensation package (Sanyal and Bulan,
2010). Chemmanur and Tian (2017) also argue
that takeover protection and innovation policy
may be simultaneously determined. For example,
hidden factors, such as the risk aversion of top
management, may affect both protection and
innovation, as risk-averse CEOs may choose to
invest very little in R&D and convince the board
to install more takeover protection.
The 2SLS model is estimated by first regress-
ing incentive and protection against all the con-
trol variables discussed in the above section and
the instrumental variables discussed below (first
stage). Then, we use the predicted values of in-
centive and protection from the first stage as the
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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explanatory variables in the following regression
(second stage):
innovationi,t+1 = α0 +β ∗ predicted incentivei,t
+β ∗ predicted protectioni,t
+β ∗ predicted incentivei,t∗
× predicted protectioni,t
+β ∗ control variablesi,t
+ year dummyi,t+ industry dummyi,t
+ εi,t (1)
Following Kini and Williams (2012), we use
the industry median of the proportion of equity-
based compensation in the total CEO compensa-
tion package as the instrument for CEO incentives.
A firm’s compensation size and structure may well
be related to other firms in the same industry, but
it is unlikely that the industry-level compensation
would have a direct effect on the firm’s innovation
strategy. Following Humphery-Jenner (2014), we
use state-level protection, the anti-takeover pro-
visions in the state law and industry-level protec-
tion as instruments for a firm’s takeover protec-
tion. Given the legal setting in the USA, firms in
the same state tend to have similar takeover de-
fences. Likewise, as takeover activities are indus-
try specific, firms in the same industry face similar
takeover threats. However, while state laws and in-
dustry patterns may shape a firm’s protection, they
should have no direct effect on its R&D process.
We realize that some of the independent vari-
ables in our study might be related to one an-
other. For instance, Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994)
show that the resistance to takeover is negatively
related to the CEO’s stock ownership. In order to
address this issue, we use a simultaneous equa-
tion framework in which innovation, incentive and
protection are assumed to be jointly determined.
In this framework, each endogenous variable in
the system (innovation, incentive and protection)
is first regressed on the relevant instruments and
control variables and then their predicted values
are computed.6 The instruments for incentives and
6We use simultaneous equations to explain R&D inten-
sity rather than R&D productivity because the latter only
materializes several years later. Thus, it is difficult to argue
that R&D productivity is jointly determined with incen-
tive and protection.
protection remain the same as in the 2SLS mod-
els above. Following Kini and William (2012), we
use industrial average R&D intensity as the instru-
ment for a firm’s R&D intensity. The simultaneous
equations are:
innovationi,t = α0 + β ∗ predicted incentivei,t
+β ∗ predicted protectioni,t
+β ∗ predicted incentivei,t∗
× protectioni,t+β ∗ control variablesi,t
+ year dummyi,t + industry dummyi,t
+ εi,t (2)
incentivei,t = α0 +β ∗ predicted innovationi,t
+β ∗ predicted protectioni,t
+β ∗ control variablesi,t + year
× dummyi,t + industry dummyi,t
+ εi,t (3)
protectioni,t = α 0 +β ∗ predicted incentivei,t
+β ∗ predicted innovationi,t
+β ∗ control variablesi,t + year
× dummyi,t + industry dummyi,t
+ εi,t (4)
All the above models include year and industry
dummies to control for time and industry fixed ef-
fects and all estimates are based on robust standard
errors clustered at firm level.
Results
Incentives, protection and innovation
The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test suggests that in-
centive and protection are endogenous (not tabu-
lated). To mitigate the endogeneity concerns, we
use both 2SLS and simultaneous equations. As ex-
plained earlier, we use multiple instruments for the
endogenous variables in the first stage of the 2SLS
model. The Kleibergen–Paap test and the Cragg–
Donald–Wald F-test show that our selected instru-
ments are individually and jointly related to the
endogenous variables with strong significance; the
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 3. Innovation – intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 2SLS 2SLS System FE
Dependent variable R&D ratio R&D ratio R&D ratio R&D ratio
Equity compensation 0.133*** 0.268*** 0.158*** 0.055**
(0.025) (0.091) (0.035) (0.024)
CG index 0.012 −0.020*** 0.007**
(0.012) (0.005) (0.003)
Equity * CG index −0.041** −0.007 −0.009*
(0.020) (0.007) (0.005)
ROA −0.111*** −0.160*** −0.166*** −0.031***
(0.028) (0.018) (0.005) (0.003)
Tobin’s Q 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.000**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO tenure 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital exp −0.011 0.029 0.000 0.008
(0.025) (0.022) (0.013) (0.007)
PPE −0.031*** −0.031*** −0.022*** 0.000
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
KZ index −0.000 −0.000* −0.000 −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutional shareholding −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Analysts coverage 0.002* 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Debt ratio −0.008 −0.023*** −0.015*** −0.007***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Firm size −0.017*** −0.015*** −0.017*** −0.011***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.111*** 0.066 0.193*** 0.070***
(0.016) (0.044) (0.019) (0.014)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17,957 14,214 14,632 14,214
F-statistic/R-squareda 24.475 20.703 N/A 0.202
This table presents the 2SLS (Columns (1) and (2)), simultaneous (Column (3)) and fixed-effects (Column (4)) regressions of innovation
intensity on CEO incentives and takeover protection. The dependent variable innovation is measured by R&D-to-total assets ratio. The
main explanatory variables are CEO incentives, defined as the proportion of equity-based compensation in total compensation, and
takeover protection, measured by a corporate governance (CG) index, which reflects firms’ use of anti-takeover provisions, including
classified boards, dual-class shares, super-majority voting, unequal voting rights, confidential voting, cumulative voting, poison pills,
golden parachutes and fair price provision. Other control variables are return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, CEO tenure (in years),
capital expenditure-to-total assets ratio (Capital exp), percentage of fixed assets-to-total assets ratio (PPE), Kaplan and Zingales index
(KZ index), institutional shareholding percentage (Institutional shareholding), number of analysts following the company (Analysts
coverage), debt-to-total assets ratio (Debt ratio) and total assets (Firm size). A detailed definition of all variables used in our analysis
is provided in the Appendix.
Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
aF scores are reported in Columns (1) and (2). Overall R-squared is reported in Column (4). We do not report R-squared for 2SLS
regressions since, with the use of instruments, the residual sum of squares is no longer constrained to be smaller than the total sum of
squares. Therefore, it is possible to have negative R-squared and R-squared does not have the same meaning for goodness-of-fit as in
OLS regressions.
Hansen’s J-test suggests that our instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term.7
7Occasionally, Hansen’s J-test rejects the null hypothesis
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.
In this situation, we adjusted the set of instruments by
Table 3 reports the results from the 2SLS (Eq.
(1)) and simultaneous equations framework (Eqs
(2) to (4)). Columns (1) and (2) present the 2SLS
estimates with R&D expenditure as the innovation
removing anti-takeover provisions in the state law and/or
industry average level of protection.
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 2. Effect of incentive and protection on innovation – intensity
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
measure. Column (1) shows that a firm’s R&D ex-
penditure is significantly positively associated with
the percentage of equity-based compensation in
its CEO’s compensation package. This finding is
consistent with Kini and Williams (2012) and Xue
(2007), and supports H1.
Column (2) reports the results with incentive,
protection and their interaction as the main
explanatory variables in Eq. (1). The effect of
incentive on R&D expenditure is both statistically
and economically significant, with a one-standard-
deviation increase in equity-based compensation
resulting in a 7.7% (i.e. 0.268 × 0.286) increase
in R&D ratio. However, the effect of protection on
R&D is insignificant and the interaction between
incentive and protection is significantly negative,
implying that takeover protection weakens the
positive effect of incentives on innovation. In
economic terms, one additional anti-takeover
provision reduces the effect of incentives on inno-
vation by 15.3% (i.e. 0.041/0.268). The 2SLS results
confirm that equity-based compensation moti-
vates CEOs to invest more in R&D. We also show
that when CEOs are protected against takeover
threats, they tend to avoid investing in R&D. The
diminishing effect of incentive on innovation in
the presence of protection is consistent with the
prediction of H2b, but not with that of H2a.
In line with Mazzola, Perrone and Kamuriwo
(2016), we also plot the moderating effect in
Figure 2. The low protection line shows the ef-
fect of incentives on innovation when protection is
weak (i.e. belowmedian), while the high protection
line presents the effect of incentive on innovation
when protection is strong (i.e. above median). Fig-
ure 2 confirms that incentives have stronger effects
on innovation when protection is low.
Similar results are obtained when incentive, pro-
tection and R&D are assumed to be determined
in a system of equations (see Column (3), but with
protection having an insignificant moderating
effect) and when firm fixed effects are considered
(Column (4)). As for the control variables, we find
that firms with better accounting performance
(ROA) invest less in R&D.We also find that CEOs
with longer tenure invest more in R&D. This result
is consistent with the ‘career concern’ argument of
Barker and Mueller (2002), who maintain that the
longer the CEO is in position the less myopic she
becomes.8 Tobin’s Q is positive and significant,
implying that firms with strong performance
invest more in R&D. Companies with larger insti-
tutional ownership invest less in R&D, consistent
with the findings of Choi, Park and Hong (2012)
and Tribo, Berrone and Surroca (2007). Finally,
consistent with the literature (He and Tian, 2013;
Kini and Williams, 2012), we show that smaller
firms with less fixed assets, less leverage and more
analyst coverage spend more on innovation.
In Table 4, we show that a firm’s expenditure
on R&D is correlated with both CEO compen-
sation and takeover protection. However, a firm’s
decision to conduct and disclose R&Dmay not be
randomandmay be driven by the same factors that
affect incentives and protection. To resolve this
potential selection bias, we apply a Heckman
two-stage selection model. In the first stage, we
regress a treatment variable, which equals one if a
firm has reported positive R&D spending and zero
otherwise, on the explanatory variables included in
Eq. (1). In the second stage, we regress R&D ex-
penditure on the same set of explanatory variables
and the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage.
The result of the second stage confirms our earlier
finding that incentives stimulate R&D spending
8It is also possible to argue that CEOs with longer tenure
are more likely to be awarded with equity-based compen-
sation and may therefore have more opportunity to en-
gage in R&D. We test this by replicating Table 3 using a
subsample of CEO of short tenure (less than the median
of five years). We show that the relation between incen-
tives and innovation is not driven by CEOs with longer
tenure.
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Table 4. Innovation – productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model 2SLS 2SLS Poisson GMM 2SLS 2SLS Poisson GMM
Dependent variable (log)Patentst+2 (log)Patentst+2 Patentst+2 (log)Citationt+2 (log)Citationt+2 Citationt+2
Equity compensation 1.553** 7.433** 18.755* 2.102* 11.781*** 25.801
(0.771) (3.049) (10.327) (1.100) (4.509) (45.790)
CG index 0.743* 2.683 1.238** 3.727
(0.415) (1.641) (0.618) (7.219)
Equity * CG index −1.909** −4.153** −3.019** −5.118
(0.877) (1.771) (1.293) (7.381)
ROA −0.132 −0.355 −0.811 −0.110 −0.293 0.144
(0.102) (0.363) (1.680) (0.152) (0.533) (2.050)
Tobin’s Q 0.070*** 0.092*** −0.066 0.083*** 0.109** −0.129
(0.020) (0.033) (0.059) (0.030) (0.050) (0.156)
CEO tenure 0.002 −0.006 0.009 0.003 −0.007 0.018
(0.005) (0.008) (0.018) (0.007) (0.012) (0.037)
Capital exp 0.339 1.510 5.801** 0.472 2.097 7.180
(0.689) (1.093) (2.860) (0.999) (1.623) (4.748)
PPE −0.423* −0.928** −2.808** −0.553 −1.277** −2.922
(0.250) (0.393) (1.205) (0.339) (0.555) (4.588)
KZ index 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.003 0.030
(0.001) (0.002) (0.022) (0.001) (0.003) (0.043)
Institutional shareholding −0.008*** −0.003 0.001 −0.011*** −0.004 −0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.016)
Analysts coverage 0.064** 0.153** 0.357*** 0.087** 0.209** 0.418***
(0.032) (0.069) (0.096) (0.044) (0.100) (0.150)
Debt ratio −0.400*** −0.345 −1.327 −0.524*** −0.507 −2.522
(0.131) (0.217) (1.268) (0.188) (0.320) (4.149)
Firm size 0.145*** 0.207*** 0.542*** 0.143** 0.227** 0.613
(0.044) (0.062) (0.209) (0.062) (0.089) (0.805)
Constant −0.816*** −3.269** −99.104 −0.325 −4.406** −25.435
(0.184) (1.456) (.) (0.259) (2.195) (44.337)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4,848 4,251 4,251 4,848 4,251 4,251
F-statistic/pseudo-R-squareda 25.125 17.379 0.065 20.302 15.188 0.064
This table presents results of the 2SLS regressions of innovation productivity onCEO incentives and takeover protection. The dependent
variable innovation is measured by the number of patents successfully applied for (Columns (1) to (3)) and the number of citations
received on patents (Columns (4) to (6)). The main explanatory variables are CEO incentives, defined as the proportion of equity-based
compensation in total compensation, and takeover protection, measured by a corporate governance (CG) index, which reflects firms’
use of anti-takeover provisions, including classified boards, dual-class shares, super-majority voting, unequal voting rights, confidential
voting, cumulative voting, poison pills, golden parachutes and fair price provision. Other control variables are return on assets (ROA),
Tobin’s Q, CEO tenure (in years), capital expenditure-to-total assets ratio (Capital exp), percentage of fixed assets-to-total assets ratio
(PPE), Kaplan and Zingales index (KZ index), institutional shareholding percentage (Institutional shareholding), number of analysts
following the company (Analysts coverage), debt-to-total assets ratio (Debt ratio) and total assets (Firm size). A detailed definition of
all variables used in our analysis is provided in the Appendix.
Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
aF scores are reported in Columns (1), (2), (4) and (5). Pseudo-R-squared is reported in Columns (3) and (6).
and this relationship is weaker in the presence of
takeover protection.9
Table 4 reports the results of the 2SLS and Pois-
son equations with patents and citations as inno-
vation measures. We use the logarithm of the num-
ber of patents (Columns (1) and (2)) and citations
9Estimation results can be found inTableA of the Internet
Appendix.
(Columns (4) and (5)) in t + 2 as the innovation
measures. We find that firms with more equity-
based compensation develop more patents and
havemore citations, consistent withH1.Moreover,
the interaction terms in Columns (2) and (5) are
negative, indicating that takeover protection weak-
ens the positive effect of incentives on innovation
(consistent with H2b). Figure 3 also shows that
the effect of incentives on patents and citations
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 3. Effect of incentive and protection on innovation – productivity [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
can turn negative when the firm is well protected,
suggesting that managers tend to underperform in
innovation productivity when they are insulated
from takeover pressure.
Since the original patent and citation data is
not continuous, we repeat our analysis using Pois-
son regressions to treat the number of patents
and citations as count variables. We use the two-
step GMM estimator with the Poisson regressions
in order to tackle endogeneity concerns. The re-
sults from the Poisson regressions are similar to
those obtained from the 2SLS (Column (3)), ex-
cept that in the Poisson regressions, incentives
and protection do not significantly affect citations
(Column (6)).
The results pertaining to the control variables
are also largely consistent with the literature (Fang,
Tian and Tice, 2014; He and Tian, 2013). Specif-
ically, we find that firms with strong stock mar-
ket performance acquiremore high-quality patents
(measured by citations). Consistent with the re-
sults of the R&D intensity, we also find that firms
with less fixed assets and less leverage have bet-
ter R&D productivity. Furthermore, we find that
large firms develop better-quality patents. Finally,
we report a positive association between analyst
coverage andR&Dproductivity, suggesting that fi-
nancial analysts serve as external monitors to im-
prove management decisions (Barron, Byard and
Yu, 2008; Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999).
Innovation and firm value
To test the mediating effect of innovation on firm
value, measured by Tobin’s Q in the future peri-
ods, we use a stepwise method similar to that in
Baron and Kenny (1986) and Xia and Liu (2017)
and report the results in Table 5. Column (1) shows
that incentive is a significant predictor of the next
period firm value, consistent with Chemmanur
and Tian (2017). In line with our earlier findings,
Column (2) of Table 5 shows that incentive is sig-
nificantly related to the mediator (i.e. the number
of patents acquired in the future period). We also
show that the independent variable (incentive) and
the mediator (number of patents) are positive and
significant when both are included in the firm value
regression (Column (3)). The estimated coefficient
on incentive in Column (3) is lower than its coun-
terpart in Column (1), implying a partial media-
tion of innovation on firm value. This partial effect
suggests that innovation is only one of the many
channels through which incentives can affect firm
value. We also show that our results are not sensi-
tive to the length of the lag between R&D invest-
ment and innovation output (Columns (4) to (6)).
Overall, our findings support H3, which sug-
gests that innovation is essential to the long-term
survivability of the firm and can be motivated by
higher levels of equity-based incentives in the CEO
compensation packages.
Additional analysis and robustness
checks
Alternative estimation methods
As a robustness check on our results, we apply
structural equation modelling (SEM) to evalu-
ate all relationships presented in Figure 4 in a
single framework.10 Compared to the regression
10See He and Wong (2004) for further discussions on the
application of SEM.
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Table 5. Future firm value, accounting profitability and mediating effect of innovation
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Qt+1 Patentst+1 Qt+1 Qt+2 Patentst+2 Qt+2
Equity compensation 0.361*** 0.189*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.160*** 0.183***
(0.048) (0.039) (0.062) (0.049) (0.044) (0.068)
Patentst+1 0.180***
Patentst+2 (0.020) 0.157***
(0.022)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17,687 6,590 6,470 15,546 5,214 5,053
Overall R-squared 0.139 0.391 0.145 0.096 0.400 0.108
This table presents the relations between innovation, incentive and firm value. Columns (1) to (3) present the three-step regressions of
mediating effects of innovation on firm value in the future (t + 1). Columns (4) to (6) present the three-step regressions of mediating
effects of innovation on firm value in the future (t + 2). Control variables for CEO and firm characteristics are included.
Statistical significance is based on the heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Figure 4. Structural equation modelling
analysis, which focuses on a limited number of
variables and relationships, SEM is able to
evaluate multiple model construct relationships
simultaneously (Chen, Bharadwaj and Goh,
2017; Iacobucci, 2009). We map all hypothesized
relationships in a path analysis in Figure 4. The
observed variables, including protection, incentive,
innovation intensity and firm value, are presented
in rectangles, while innovation productivity, mea-
sured by the number of patents and citations, is
a latent construct in oval. All control variables
are included in SEM, but omitted in Figure 4 for
brevity. We use robust standard errors and stan-
dardized estimates. The goodness-of-fit statistics
indicate satisfactory model fit: the standardized
root mean square residual of our model is 0.041,
which is below the benchmark of 0.08 suggested by
Hu and Bentler (1999). The path analysis results,
which are shown in Figure 4, confirm our findings
in the regression analysis. Specifically, incentives
have significantly positive effects on innovation
intensity and productivity and such effects are
weakened by protection. Innovation productivity
contributes to firm value, which, in turn, is posi-
tively related to incentives. The covariance between
incentives and protection is low and insignificant.
Alternative measure of incentives and protection
Table 6 reports the robustness of our results to
alternative measures of managerial incentives and
takeover protection. Since the 2SLSmethod allevi-
ates endogeneity concerns and since the causality
issue addressed by the system of equations is less
of a concern when examining innovation produc-
tivity, we choose to report the 2SLS only. Stock
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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options have experienced the most remarkable
increase over the sample period and are shown to
have a stronger link with the long-term stock price
performance than other types of compensation
(Ryan and Wiggins, 2002). We repeat our analysis
using the ratio of stock options to total compen-
sation and the ratio of restricted stock granted
to total compensation as alternative measures
of CEO incentives (Columns (1) to (4) in Table
5). Consistent with the earlier results, we report
a significantly positive association between the
percentage of stock options in total compensation
and innovation (Columns (1) and (2)). However,
Columns (3) and (4) suggest that the percentage
of restricted stock in total compensation is not
significantly related to innovation. This evidence
is consistent with Ryan and Wiggins (2002),
who argue that options are more effective than
restricted stock in providing long-term incentives
and offsetting negative outcomes in the case of
unsuccessful R&D investments. The signs and
significance of the coefficients on protection and
the interaction between incentive and protection
are consistent with those in Table 4, indicating
that anti-takeover provisions weaken the positive
effect of options on innovation.
We also replace the incentive measure in the
regressions presented in Table 4 with the CEO’s
pay-for-performance sensitivity (delta) and then
with the wealth to volatility sensitivity (vega).11
In unreported results, we find that delta does not
affect innovation, consistent withGuay’s (1999) ar-
gument that higher delta increases managers’ risk
exposure and lowers the propensity for risk taking.
However, the significantly positive association
between vega and innovation suggests that the in-
creased sensitivity of CEOs’ wealth to stock return
volatility helps to align managerial risk-taking
behaviour with shareholders’ interests (Chang
et al., 2015; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006).
We also show that the interaction term between
vega and the anti-takeover measures is negatively
and significantly associated with innovation,
providing further support for the weakening effect
of anti-takeover protection (H2b).12
11Following others (Chang et al., 2015; Coles, Daniel and
Naveen, 2006), we define delta as the dollar change in the
CEO’s wealth for a 1% change in stock price and vega as
the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth associated with a
1% change in standard deviation of stock returns.
12Further details on these analyses are available upon re-
quest.
Next, we investigate whether some protection
measures aremore effective than others inmotivat-
ing innovation by using dummy variables for indi-
vidual anti-takeover provisions instead of the CG
index in our regressions. Columns (5) to (7) show
that classified board, golden parachute and fair
price have a more detrimental impact on the pos-
itive relation between incentives and innovation.
Other provisions are either statistically or eco-
nomically insignificant. We also repeat our anal-
ysis using the median value of the equity-based
compensation of the board of directors as an alter-
native measure for incentives. Columns (8) to (10)
show that the board incentives are significantly
positively related to innovation, consistent with
Chang et al.’s (2015) finding that non-executive
stock options spur innovation. Furthermore,
the interaction between board incentives and
anti-takeover provisions is significantly negative,
confirming our earlier findings that anti-takeover
provisions dampen the positive effect of incentives
on innovation. Thus, our results are not only
restricted to the CEO, but the incentives granted
to other directors also influence innovation.
The role of competition and innovation pressure
Inspired by Chemmanur and Tian (2017), we also
analyse whether a firm’s decision to invest in R&D
is affected by its competitive environment. We use
the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) to evalu-
ate the degree of competitiveness in a sector (4-
digit SIC). We split our sample into two subgroups
based on their sector median HHI. Columns (1) to
(4) of Table 7 show that the effect of incentive on in-
novation is almost exclusive to firms in highly com-
petitive environments (low HHI). The direct effect
of protection on innovation is also positive, but
only significant for firms in more competitive in-
dustries and when R&D expenditure is used as the
innovation measure. However, the moderating ef-
fect of takeover protection is only significant in the
low-HHI subsample, implying that takeover pro-
tection encourages managers to shirk even when
external competition is high. In Columns (5) to
(8), we analyse the effects of incentive and protec-
tion in the subsamples of innovation-active and
non-innovation-active industries, using themedian
number of patents acclaimed by an industry as
benchmark. We find that the positive effect of
CEO incentives on innovation is only significant
in innovation-active industries. In industries where
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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innovation is less important, additional incentives
do not spur innovation. Our results also suggest
that protection does not have any significant effect
in these subsample regressions.13
The relationship between equity-based compen-
sation and innovation may be more pronounced
among small firms, possibly because these firms
are more likely to become takeover targets. We
investigate whether firm size affects the relation-
ships between incentive, protection and innova-
tion. We partition the sample into terciles based
on total assets and report the results in Table 7
(Columns (9) to (12)). The results pertaining to
small and medium firms are consistent with those
reported in Section 5.1. We show that incentive
and protection have a positive, but their interaction
term has a negative, effect on the R&D expendi-
ture of large firms.14 Finally, neither incentive nor
protection affects the innovation output of large
firms.15
Discussion and conclusions
In Manso’s (2011) theoretical framework, the keys
to motivate innovation are long-term incentives
and protection from failure. However, according
to agency theory, entrenched managers are more
likely to shirk and underinvest in risky and time-
consuming R&D activities. While most studies
show that long-term incentives stimulate innova-
tion, existing evidence on the effect of protection
on innovation is largely mixed. Some studies show
13We also investigate whether our main finding is more
pronounced among firms in high-technology sectors.
However, we do not find significant relations between in-
novation, incentive and protection in the reduced sample
of companies belonging to high-tech groups. Estimation
results can be found in Table B of the Internet Appendix.
14The economic significance of incentive, protection and
their interaction term is larger for small andmediumfirms
than larger firms (20.15%, 60.72% and −15.49%, respec-
tively vs. 3.38%, 2.28% and 4.10%, respectively).
15We also verify this size effect using alternative model
specifications. Consistent with the 2SLS results, the fixed-
effects regressions suggest that incentive and protection
only have significant effects on innovation intensity in
the small and medium subsample. Similarly, the Poisson
regressions indicate that incentive, protection and their
interaction have a significant impact on the number of
patents in the small and medium subsample, but only the
interaction term is shown to be significant (negative) in
the case of large firms. Estimation results can be found in
Table C of the Internet Appendix.
that anti-takeover provisions are detrimental
to innovation (Atanassov, 2013; O’Connor and
Rafferty, 2012), while others find that takeover
protection promotes innovation (Chemmanur
and Tian, 2017; Zeng, 2014). In this paper, we
provide the first empirical evidence of the mod-
erating effect of incentives and protection on
innovation.
Our analysis reveals a significantly positive
association between equity-based compensation
and innovation, consistent with the literature sug-
gesting that long-term success incentives motivate
innovation (Makri, Lane and Gomez-Mejia, 2006;
Manso, 2011; Sanyal and Bulan, 2010). However,
when incentives and protection are considered
together, we find that the latter reduces the ability
of the former to promote innovation. This implies
that takeover protection encourages risk-averse
managers with high equity-based compensation
to avoid risky innovation in order to reduce the
sensitivity of their compensation portfolios to
their firms’ stock price movements (Carpenter,
2000; Ross, 2004). Thus, our finding suggests that
the discipline of takeover markets is essential for
managers who receive high long-term incentives
to perform, as intended.
This study also extends the literature by showing
that the relationship between takeover protection
and innovation depends on the context in which
anti-takeover provisions are implemented. Specif-
ically, we find that anti-takeover protections have
a positive direct effect and a negative effect when
used in conjunction with equity-based compen-
sation. We also show that both these effects are
stronger for small firms and in highly competitive
environments. The positive effect of protection
is stronger in these contexts because protection
from opportunistic takeovers is likely to be more
important for small firms and firms in highly
competitive industries, as these firms are more
exposed to takeover threats and expected to invest
more in innovation to withstand competitive
pressure. Nevertheless, the interactive effect of
protection and incentives remains negative and
significant even for small firms and firms in highly
competitive industries, implying that competition
cannot replace takeover threats as a mechanism
for reducing managerial shirking. Collectively,
our results help explain the mixed evidence doc-
umented by existing studies on the innovation
effect of anti-takeover amendments (Chemmanur
and Tian, 2017; Pugh, 1992). Finally, given the
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ambiguity of innovation’s contribution to firm
value, we propose innovation as a partial medi-
ator of the relationship between incentives and
firm value. In this framework, incentive induces
managers tomaximize shareholders’ wealth. Inno-
vation represents one of the effective approaches
that managers can take in order to improve firm
value. However, not all innovations can create
value. For this reason, we focus our analysis
on patented innovation outputs, which has the
potential to generate competitive advantage.
This study has practical implications for share-
holders, managers and policymakers. It explains
how incentives and protection should be used to
spur innovation. It shows that equity-based incen-
tives are more likely to stimulate innovation when
combined with market discipline and that anti-
takeover provisions can motivate innovation when
used alone, but not when used in conjunction with
equity-based compensation. Companies should
be aware of the costs and benefits of anti-takeover
provisions. While these provisions mitigate
takeover pressure, their hidden costs of manage-
ment entrenchment are often overlooked and can
have a detrimental effect on innovation and future
performance. Furthermore, given the crucial role
of innovation in promoting economic growth, our
results suggest that policymakers should carefully
consider the side-effect of anti-takeover laws on
innovation. Limited use of anti-takeover laws
helps maintain competition in the market, which
in turn delivers better innovation performance
overall. Lastly, managers and shareholders need
to realize that although R&D investment can
be a long and uncertain process, the success of
innovation, especially when the outputs are pro-
tected by patents, can significantly increase firm
value. Thus, managers who are compensated by
share-based plans can enhance shareholders’
wealth by investing in innovative projects with the
potential to generate economic rents.
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of
US listed companies. Since the US market has
well-developed regulations and laws, particularly
in the area of anti-takeover, our results may not be
generalizable to other markets without caution.
Future studies in the USA or other countries
should consider these factors. Furthermore, the
finding that anti-takeover provisions reduce the
effectiveness of equity-based compensation in pro-
moting innovation does not necessarily suggest
that all failure protection mechanisms are detri-
mental to innovation. For example, Acharya and
Subramanian (2009) show that debtor-friendly
bankruptcy laws encourage firm-level innovation
andAcharya et al. (2013) find that stringent labour
laws restricting the dismissal of employees lead
to more innovation. Future research should focus
on whether combining long-term incentives with
protection mechanisms other than anti-takeover
provisions spurs innovation. Finally, there are at
least two important limitations with using patent
data: (i) not all innovation outputs are patented
(Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001);16 and (ii) data
on patents is only available up to 2010. However,
despite these limitations, no other widely available
measure can better capture corporate innovation
(Griliches, 1992).
16Some inventions do notmeetUSPTO’s patentability cri-
teria and other inventors may rely on means other than
patents (e.g. secrecy) to protect their inventions.
C© 2018 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
20 K. Mazouz and Y. Zhao
Appendix
Variable definitions
Innovation measures
R&D expenditure Total R&D expenditure ($m)
R&D ratio Total R&D expenditure/total assets
Patents Number of patents applied for by a firm in a year
Citations Number of non-self-citations received on patents
applied for by a firm in a year
Incentive measures
CEO’s total compensation Total compensation ($000) for the CEO in the firm
year
CEO’s equity compensation CEO’s equity-based compensation/total
compensation
CEO’s stock options CEO’s value of stock options/total compensation
Protection measures
CG index Self-constructed measure for anti-takeover protection
Control variables
ROA Operating income/total assets
Tobin’s Q (Market value of equity + book value of assets –
book value of equity – deferred tax)/book value of
assets
CEO tenure Number of years the CEO has served in the firm
Capital exp Capital expenditure/total assets
PPE Value of fixed assets/total assets
KZ index Kaplan and Zingales index (see Kaplan and Zingales,
1997)
Institutional shareholding Percentage of shares held by institutional investors
Analysts coverage Number of analysts following the firm
Debt ratio Total debt/total assets
Firm size Total assets
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